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NOTES
THIRD WORLD DEBT: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
I. INTRODUCION
The world debt crisis is arguably the most critical and far-reaching
international issue of the decade. Its legal, political and socio-economic
ramifications permeate the governments of virtually every nation, multi-
national corporation and financial institution, as well as individual
consumers. Throughout the 1970s, and particularly the 1980s, public and
private instrumentalities experienced market gyrations which began with
periods of prosperity, stemming from great influxes of capital and lenient
credit policies, and led to the current predicament of unstable economic
indicators, less stable developing countries, and an unprecedented
international debt dilemma. While the debt has continued to burgeon,
viable solutions to curtail it are scarce.
It is impossible to effectively evaluate the various proposals for
alleviation of third world debt without first understanding the events that
brought it to its current position. Section II of this Note will discuss
these events, noting from the benefit of hindsight whether and how
intervention may have been desirable as a measure to relieve debt
burdens before they reached the level of crisis. In Section III, traditional
attempts to cure the debt will be examined. While these attempts have
not proved successful, it is imperative to realize the sensitive socio-
political nature of the debt problem and the corresponding pressures that
have disrupted tools which would otherwise have been effective in
disposing of debt. Section IV will explore more recent, less traditional
approaches toward debt alleviation. While some of these include new
financial instruments and investment techniques, it is interesting to note
that often what is deemed to be new is simply a variation or fine-tuning
of the traditional.' This section will also compare the old and the new
1. There has yet to be any single panacea; therefore, each new suggestion, on first
impression, may appear to be easily implemented. Because each suggestion comprises a
different approach to alleviation, varying results may arise. After determining the viability
of an approach, it may complement the central notion. Due to potential conflicts of
approach styles and extreme administrative burdens, however, a single, or more reasonably
a few, vehicles that would accommodate most of the new ideas would be more desirable.
Narrowing the scores of suggestions into a few workable approaches is extremely
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proposals and try to achieve some degree of synthesis by which the best
parts of each may be maintained while eliminating those that are
problematic.
Underlying this discussion will be questions that necessarily must be
confronted in any account of third world debt problems. Who are the
parties involved? How are loans to lesser-developed countries ("LDCs")
to be enforced? What happens in the event of default? These concerns
are central in developing a workable, effective program aimed at
shrinking the debt.
H. WHY WE ARE WHERE WE ARE
In 1973-74, the Oil Producing and Exporting Cartel ("OPEC")
announced large increases in the price of oil. As the price of oil went
up, so did the revenues of the OPEC members. These revenues, called
petrodollars because they were raised by the sale of petroleum, resulted
in a tremendous availability of funds for investment. In an effort to
achieve a favorable rate of return on money, while still maintaining a
secure investment, OPEC "dumped" much of their newly created
petrodollars into American banking institutions.2 This sudden influx left
United States banks with a great deal of liquid capital. Conveniently,
while these banks were looking for investments, less developed countries
were seeking United States petrodollars.
At the time it appeared to be a perfect marriage. The prospects of
the LDCs were bright. They had an abundance of untapped natural
resources, and the global environment was ripe for development. World
oil and commodity prices were high and climbing, and it was these
industries in which the LDCs had the greatest potential for development.'
Mexico, in particular, had a vast oil producing capability. These factors
made loans to LDCs appear to be very secure investments. Rich oil and
commodity reserves, coupled with the trend in world markets, made the
ability of LDCs to repay debt appear strong. Because developing
countries were believed to be a good investment, and because the
investor-banks had substantial capital reserves, the banks began to
compete against each other to offer the best rate of interest to the LDCs
on their loans.4 As a result, loan spreads thinned while global inflation
complicated because of the innate inconsistencies between theories. Hence, mere
reconciliation of these ideas is inherently problematic.
2. Note, Treasury Secretary James Baker's "Program for Sustained Growth" for the
International Debt Crisis: Three Steps Toward Global Financial Security, 4 DICK J. hrNr'L L.
275, 277 n.14 (1986).
3. W. CuiNe, 1 N tO iAL DEt. SY grEmAmc RISK ANO PoucY RESPONSE 6-8 (1984).
4. McNamar, The International Debt Problem: Working Out A Solution, in The. GLOBAL
FINANcIAL STRuciuRE IN TRANsITON, CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND
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rates remained high5 Therefore, the real rate of interest LDCs were
paying was often negative.6
In this type of credit environment, it is easy to understand why a
country would continue to refinance. Economically, it was cheaper
because high inflation decreases the real debt over time by decreasing its
present value. Furthermore, because the LDCs were borrowing from
commercial banks, there were no exterior conditions tied to their loans.
They could receive financing with their only obligation being to maintain
their service schedule. The LDCs did not have to spend on particular
programs, invest in particular industries, or alter their consumption. In
contrast, loans from the International Monetary Fund (the "IMF') offer
financial support but make borrowing dependent upon other terms.7
Of the terms imposed upon the LDCs by the IMF, the most
distasteful is the implementation of austerity programs.8 An austerity
policy redirects money from current domestic programs toward longer
term investment projects in order to stimulate growth and productivity
and promote an increased quality of life in the future. By definition,
however, such a policy detracts from current living conditions. 9 Austerity
programs therefore, are politically problematic for governments of
borrowing countries because their citizens will generally not welcome cut-
TRADE 127, 128 (J. McClellan ed. 1985).
5. Id. A loan spread represents the difference between the rate of interest charged and
the rate of interest the bank must pay its depositors. The difference between the rate of
inflation and the rate of interest being charged is known as the real rate of interest. A
primary way for lenders to compete is to reduce the interest rate they charge. As a result
the real rate of interest as well as the loan spread decline. Because a rate of interest
charged should reflect the risk involved in the loan, as the interest rates decline the risk
should be declining. In the case of the LDCs, however, it was not that the risk of the
venture was declining but rather that the competition among creditors was driving the real
rate of interest down. See id.
6. Id; see also, Bohn, Govermental Response to Third World Debt The Role of the
Export-Import Bank, 21 STAN. 1. 1N"r'l L. 461, 462 (1985) (if the rate of inflation exceeds
the rate of interest being charged, then the real rate of interest is negative).
7. Note, supra note 2, at 278.
8. On March 6, 1986, the Intergovernmental Group of 24 issued a press communique
after their meeting. Group of 24 Communique... Developing Countriess Call for New
Efforts on Deb4 Foreign Aid, and Monetary Reform, reprinted in 15 IMF SURVEY 90 (Mar.
17, 1986). They emphasized that traditional short-term adjustment policies were not
compatible with the attainment of long-term equilibrium and that austerity programs fail to
take sufficient account of the seriousness of the structural problems that the LDCs face.
Id. Furthermore, they asserted that continual renegotiation leads to uncertainty by
prolonging debt service problems rather than addressing them and thereby has a negative
effect on their economic, social and political prospects, hence, seriously affecting the
standard of living and threatening social and political stability. Id.
9. See id.
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backs in their already weak economies. 10 Consequently, if financing that
is not based on austerity terms is available, borrowers will tend to accept
the condition-free loans in order to avoid adverse changes in their
lifestyle. This method of short-sighted decision making ignores the goal
of long-term development pursued by each of the players - debtors,
creditors, and the global community-as well as the consequences of
unguided spending, such as increased domestic spending and inflation
without a corresponding increase in domestic productivity. Ignoring these
factors results in the need for continued exterior financing and the
accumulation of debt. n1
Perhaps the debt crisis might have been avoided if LDCs had
accepted austerity, with its long-term development goals, as many
creditors had encouraged them to do in the 1970s. Practically, however,
human nature will not adopt such forward-looking policies absent
sufficient provocation.1 A more fundamental reason for the debt crisis
exists, however, than merely rejecting the exercise of self-constraint.
Because low interest and high inflation rates made borrowing virtually
free.u Continued debt financing need not be fatal if the funds are
properly allocated. For instance, had the LDCs invested the borrowed
capital in programs designed to increase the efficiency, and hence the
competitiveness, of their local industries while also allocating a portion
to consumer spending, growth may have ensued while the LDCs
maintained a desirable standard of living and provided the economy with
the capital to meet the expanding output.1 4 This policy agenda was not
adopted. Instead, the LDCs used the money to finance consumption,15
without accounting for the plight that might develop if interest rates rose
and inflation fell, resulting in indebtedness at high real rates of interest
without assets to show for debt that had been incurred.
In the early 1980s, this hypothetical dilemma became reality. In an
effort to curb runaway inflation, interest rates were allowed to climb.
16
10. Note, supra note 2, at 279.
11. See id.
12. For the same reasons that it is socially, politically and economically unfavorable for
an LDC to adopt austerity programs, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text, a
government will not seek to produce future benefits at the expense of the current quality
of life. Additionally, because the "marginal" standard of living is considerably lower in an
LDC then in a developed nation, diminishing the quality of life in an LDC would produce
a greater hardship upon its inhabitants. See supra note 8.
13. The economic forecast in the early 1980s led the governments, both creditor and
debtor, and the banks to believe that interest rates were not going to experience much of
a rise while inflation would continue. McNamar, supra note 4, at 128-29.
14. See id.
15. Id.; see also Bohn, supra note 6, at 462.
16. J. GurNAG & R. HERRING, THE CuRRENT CRISIS iN INTERNATIoNAL LENDING 13-
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As interest rates increased, the commodity and oil markets were badly
hurt. 1 7 Suddenly, the LDCs were left to pay high real interest rates while
at the same time their income was reduced, and their actual levels of
growth and development were essentially the same as a decade before.18
Most commentators will agree that what we now refer to as the debt
crisis came to fruition in August 1982 when the Mexican Government
informed the United States Treasury that its foreign exchange reserves
were depleted and it would no longer be able to make payments to its
creditors, or, in other words, to service its debt.19
Shortly after Mexico announced its inability to service its debt, other
debtors followed suit.20 In an effort not to erase the debt from the
banks' books,21 reschedulings became widespread. Refinancings22 were
more difficult to obtain. 23 Banks began to look to shorter terms to avoid
the impact of vulnerability and exposure.24 Furthermore, much of the
debt was concentrated among a few large banks.2 Because the conse-
quence of writing off these debts might have had a catastrophic impact
on international banking, as well as on every bank customer, the world
financial and political communities were forced to band together to try
to develop solutions.
14 (1985); McNamar, supra note 4, at 129-30.
17. For a brief discussion of the effect of certain economic indicators, such as the
interest rate and the inflation rate, on the commodities market, see generally Note, supra
note 2, at 280 and Bohn, supra note 6, at 463.
18. Note, supra note 2, at 280-81.
19. See McNamar, supra note 4, at 128; see also Bohn, supra note 6, at 461.
20. In 1980, it was suggested that banks were beginning to become concerned about the
level of development in debtor nations. See OECD Foresees Decline in International Lending
to Some $100 Billion, 9 IMF SuRv. 637 (Aug. 4, 1980) (OECD is the abbreviation for the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) [hereinafter OECD Foresees
Decline]. By 1983, the problem became more pronounced with the surge of rescheduling
requests. See Heineman, Third-World Debt Problem, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1983, at D1, col.
3; see also Gilpin, The Maze of Latin America's Debt, id, Mar. 13, 1983, § 3, at 4, col. 3.
21. See J. Gu rrwAG & R. HERRING, supra note 16, at 2.4.
22. A rescheduling agreement extends the time period for the repayment of the debt.
Refinancing involves the issuing of additional credit, often simply to enable the borrower
to service previously issued debt. Because refinancing requires new cash infusions by the
lender instead of merely extending the terms of older loans, it is generally more difficult
to obtain. See Lovett, Managing the Debt Crisis Economic Strains and Alternative Solutions,
21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 499, 513-16 (1985).
23. J. GuTrENTAG & R. HERRING, supra note 16, at 2-4.
24. Id.; see also OECD Forsees Decline supra note 21, which reported how banks began
to look deeper into the credit worthiness of borrowers.
25. J. GurTENAG & R. HERRING, supra note 16, at 2-4; see also Note, supra note 2, at
279-81. While almost every substantial banking institution suffered from third world debt
exposure, banks such as Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover, Chase Manhattan and Bank of
America held particularly large positions.
19901
N.Y.L ScH. 1. I1TL & COMP. L1
Ill. TRADMONAL DEBT ALLEVIATION ALTERNATIVES
The propositions that have been advanced to relieve the LDCs, the
banks, and the world financial community of their respective debt burdens
are plentiful and diverse. Each theory has its own cornerstone and its
own inadequacies, however, among the most comprehensive and widely
accepted is the proposal of former United States Treasury Secretary,
James Baker IIL26
Baker's "Program for Sustained Growth" incorporates three essential
and mutually reinforcing elements:2 (1) adoption by debtors of com-
prehensive macroeconomic and structural policies, supported by interna-
tional financial institutions; (2) a central role for the IMF, as well as
Multilateral Development Banks ("MDBs"), in support of the adoption
by debtors of market-oriented growth policies; and (3) increased lending
by private banks in support of comprehensive economic adjustment
programs.2
Baker's plan is based on a theory of cooperation between all of the
parties. Hence, in order to give life to such a plan, the participants (the
governments, the IMFs and MDBs, and, most importantly, the commercial
banks) must remain in the game. Absent their continuing participation
the theme of cooperation is abandoned, leaving each bank to negotiate
the best deal for itself. Of the three groups of participants, keeping the
banks involved was probably most difficult to achieve. Faced with the
choice of reschedule or write-off, however, and motivated primarily by
self-interest, the banks made the choice to cooperate, at least with
respect to roll-overs and rescheduling agreements. 29
The decision to extend new loans to LDCs was more difficult to
reconcile. 30 Baker's program called for each of the forces to act in
concert. The role of the commercial banks would be to increase their
26. Statement of Treasury Secretary James A. Baker before the Joint Annual Meeting
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank [hereinafter Statement of Treasury
Secretary], reprinted in Note, supra note 2, at 306-15.
27. Id at 306-11.
28. IL at 313-14.
29. Rowen, Jim Baker's Global Blueprint, INSTTUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1986, at 302,
304. The Baker plan concentrates on development rather than austerity. Id. at 302. In
order to achieve success, new funds must be extended to the LDCs. The commercial
lenders, when faced with the Baker proposal, realized that if they failed to extend further
credit, then development would be stifled and there would be no hope for recovering any
of their loans. Id. at 304. By rescheduling or rolling-over debt, the creditors gave the
LDCs an opportunity to develop without having to adjust their balance sheets. Id. Baker,
however, called for the extension of additional credits.
30. Id; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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loans to the LDCs.3Y Upon first impression, this measure defies logic.
Banks do not generally increase current liablity in an effort to decrease
prior vulnerability. Baker's program, however, is premised upon the
cognizance that the debtor countries are simply unable to repay their
existing obligations. In order to alter that situation they must undertake
market-oriented policies toward growth and development. Market-
oriented policies are aimed at making local industries more efficient and
more competitive. By investing in new machinery and worker-training
programs, LDCs would become more competitive in world markets.
Their exports would increase and their imports would decrease, resulting
in a more self-sufficient economy and an ability to service and repay their
debts. Given the abundance of natural resources in many debtor nations,
implementation of effective market-oriented policies could make the
LDCs' economies quite competitive. Such policies require capital for
implementation which must, in part, come from continued support of
lending institutions.32
Those nations involved, however, recognize that the terms of
commercial loans will no longer be condition-free. 33 Under the program,
these loans will be tied to IMF approval of policies adopted by the
borrowing countries.34 In essence, although commercial loans have not
traditionally been burdened with IMF conditions, under the Baker plan
the IMF would have the ability to implement its policies indirectly
through the commercial lenders. This "indirect-conditionality" bestows
upon the IMF the power to make the ultimate decision as to who will
receive commercial bank funding. 35 The banks promoted the placement
of indirect pressure upon the LDCs to conform to IMF policy in an
effort to force debtors to invest in growth and income-generating projects
rather than the consumption-oriented programs that led them to their
present plight.
31. Statement of Treasury Secretary, supra note 26, at 309.
32. Id at 309-10.
33. Note, supra note 2, at 283-85 and accompanying text.
34. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement].
35. Certain conditions must be met for an LDC to receive IMF approval. See Note,
supra note 2. Even with such approval, it must be remembered that the commercial banks
still must determine whether or not to extend credit. That a country has accepted certain
IMF conditions may lead a bank to believe that the country is a better credit risk thereby
making it more likely that the bank will extend the credit. On the other hand, institutional
lenders may recognize the lack of strict compliance with austerity programs, or even think
of them as too little too late and be reluctant to advance additional credit. Given the need
for global cooperation, however, as evinced by the Baker plan (see supra note 26), it is
likely that international lending institutions will continue to advance credit while searching
for new financial instruments in order to diversify their risk and clear their balance sheets.
1990]
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The IMF plays a central role in Baker's proposal.36 In addition to
the link between IMF approval of policies and commercial bank lending,
the IMF's role as a creditor is emphasized. IMF loans are based on
strict austerity plans and development policies.37 Furthermore, the World
Bank assumes a position of greater influence under the Baker Plan.m
The World Bank was originally designed to finance specific projects.39
Like the IMF, the World Bank was important not only for its financial
contributions but also for its role as technical advisor in the projects that
it supported.4 Problematic with the World Bank, however, was its
complicated and time-consuming approval process; thus, it did not play
as central a role as it could have.4 Although its record for recovery was
impressive considering its debtors, its overall impact on the crisis situation
was minimal.42 Baker's program addresses this inefficiency by making
additional capital available to the World Bank and by extending the
repayment terms of its loans,0 which was relatively short.4
Baker's plan is the most comprehensive and recognized of any aimed
at alleviation of the debt crisis. Since its commencement, however, the
plan has not been able to achieve the desired results. Unexpected
changes in the international economy, political problems of adopting
austerity programs in debtor nations, and the difficulty of developing truly
market-oriented policies have all contributed to its failure to achieve
widespread adoption.0 Before turning to some of the latest proposals
that attempt either to directly or indirectly address these concerns, this
Note will briefly examine one recent proposition set forth in an effort to
reduce world debt. This scheme lends insight into the type of creative
finance mechanisms that are being developed to combat the debt crisis.
Schools of thought are divided as to whether the debt crisis is a
solvency or liquidity problem.4 The basic difference is that if it is
36. See generally Statement of Treasury Secretary, supra note 26.
37. See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 34. The strictness of the condition of
austerity of IMF loans may become more lenient in light of socio and political practicalities.
38. See generally Statement of Treasury Secretary, supra note 26.
39. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 78.
40. Note, supra note 2, at 286.
41. Id.
42. Id at 287.
43. See Statement of Treasury Secretary, supra note 26, at 287.
44. Id.; see aso E. MASON & R. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETrAN WOODS 540
(1973). The usual length of the loans was from three to five years.
45. Note, supra note 2, at 302-05.
46. Generally, a liquidity problem is one of cash flow. The debtor nation may have the
assets to service the debt but it is currently unable to produce the case. This problem
forces the debtor to attempt to renegotiate the terms of the loan by getting an extension
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deemed to be a solvency problem, then the result would be to forgive
much, if not all, of the debt. Such a position stems from the belief that
the debtor nations are, and will continue to be, unable to service their
debt, let alone attempt to pay back the principal.47 Is such a case, banks
and creditors must write off the loans. Thus, balance sheets will need to
be adjusted to correspond with the write-offs and will result in a
tightening of available finance capital, not only among creditors, but
even among non-creditors, through a ripple-effect. 48  The necessary
implications of such a position are dire.
If creditors perceive the crisis as one of liquidity rather than
solvency, then they, and the international economy, will not suffer as
devastating a blow.49  Perception, however, is incidental to reality. In
reality, to label a situation problematic only from a point of liquidity
there must be an underlying confidence of growth and development
potential. In order to realize this potential, debtors need to gain more
capital inflows.
In an effort to accommodate more capital inflows, a proposal has
been set forth with the objective of increasing the lender's control over
the flow of capital." The core of this plan is the issuance of non-
maturing, floating-rate certificates called perpetuals. 51 These perpetuals
would need IMF approval and a portion of the capital would have to be
or to attain additional financing in order to service the loan. As a result, creditors may
suffer cash flow problems. Forcing the debtor into default can have disastrous consequen-
ces on the lender and potentially on the economy. Therefore, if the lender believes that
the debtor is merely suffering a liquidity problem, and that the debtor will be able to
alleviate that situation, it is likely that the creditor will accomodate the debtor. In doing
so, domestic interest rates may rise due to the diminished supply of available, liquid cash.
What is important to remember, however, is that a true liquidity problem will be of a short
duration and the consequences of such a situation will be correctable. See McNamar, supra
note 4, at 129-32; Lovett, supra note 22, at 508. Insolvency is unlike liquidity in that the
debtor has neither the cash nor the assets to service the debt. The borrowing nation is
simply unable to make the payments. The consequences of insolvency are more severe and
less rapidly correctable than those of liquidity problems. Lending institutions may be forced
to write off part, or all, of the outstanding debt and increase their reserves. Interest rates
will inevitably rise. Often in insolvency situations governments become involved to attempt
to alleviate the effects as much as possible. Insolvency problems generally involve a longer
recovery period. See Lovett, supra note 22, at 504 n.19, 509.
47. Id
48. Id. It is not suggested that the standard of living among creditor nations will be
decreased. Writing off substantial debt, however, may have the effect of increasing interest
rates thus making available domestic credit more expensive. Under traditional economic
theory, increased interest rates may also impact upon employment, productivity and
investment. See id. at 5.
49. See supra note 46 for a discussion of the economic benefits of addressing the crisis
as a problem of liquidity rather than one of insolvency.
50. J. GtJrrAG & R. HMNG, supra note 16, at 8-10, 11-15.
51. Id at 7.
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acquired by the IMF or a MDB.52 Two aspects of this plan, however,
make it unique. First, these certificates do not mature, hence the name
perpetuals. 53 Second, the repayment schedule of these certificates would
be based on a last-in first-out ("LIFO") method.-4
There are certain advantages to such an issuance. For one thing,
it encourages new investment.55 Unlike an ordinary loan in which the
lenders' claims would be last in priority, the contributors to a perpetual
may feel secure in that they receive priority interest payments.56 Also,
the fact that the IMF has a role in this venture further reassures
creditors that IMF surveillance practices will be followed. 7 Hence,
preconditions, performance criteria and other policies which generally
compliment an IMF plan will constitute a part of this issue.5'
The adoption of perpetuals as a mechanism to finance debt becomes
problematic when viewed from the perspective of pre-existing creditors.
It may be argued that because we have already acknowledged only a
liquidity problem and creditors are facing failing debt service, any new
proposal is welcomed in an effort to relieve debt service pressures from
the debtors. The problem with this position is that it presupposes a
general acceptance that the debt crisis is simply a liquidity problem. This
scenario is by no means as widely accepted as the writer of a perpetual
would like to believe. As discussed earlier, characterization of the debt
as a liquidity problem is a method which allows financial institutions to
keep 100% of the debt on their books without having to record any
losses. Many banks do not believe that to be the case.59 If solvency, and
not liquidity, is determined to be the factor that continues to drive the
debt, then perpetuals would become a new and different way of extending
credit without any hope of receiving future payments. Furthermore, such
52. Id
53. Id
54. Id The goal of the perpetual is to keep the money flow constant to countries
having problems servicing their debt. The LIFO method is designed to encourage the
debtors to submit to IMF stabilization policies because they would have the confidence that
additional financing would become available if necessary. The perpetual is part of a six-
part proposal set forth by Guttentag and Herring. While it may be useful in dealing with
outstanding government debt, its value in relation to private debt is less appealing. See
id. 7-8.
55. Id at 7-8.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Since the Mexican crises, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, many banks
perceive the debt to be a solvency dilemma. Absent some form of global cooperation,
"solvency-motivated" banks will increase their loss reserves and refuse to extend additional
loans to LDCs. See Lovett, supra note 22, at 504 n.19, 509.
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an argument presumes that even if the problem is deemed to be one of
liquidity, existing creditors will have no objection to taking a subordinated
role in repayment scheduling. Even if we are concerned with only
government creditors at this juncture, 6° it is unlikely that they will allow
their earlier claims to be subordinated to a new LIFO strategy.
Furthermore, when private creditors enter the scenario, the issues become
all the more complex. The LIFO method simply means that the most
recent creditor to extend funds will be the first one to receive payments
by the debtor. Only after the newest creditor's debt is serviced would
prior creditors receive any service on their loans.61 Given the history of
the debtors' inability to pay, it is unlikely that, in the short run, an LDC
would be able to pay off the perpetuals and have enough resources
remaining to service other debts. The commercial creditors, however,
have based their loans on short-term payments and would probably be
unwilling to take a junior position to subsequent creditors. Even if some
were willing to assume such a position, it would mean massive reschedul-
ings and perhaps current write-offs and increased reserves for the banks.
Additionally, although the perpetuals are based on a plan in which
there is no principal,62 only interest, the creators of this plan have
ignored what appears to be a fatal flaw. They appear to premise the
plan on an assumption that the true burden of existing credit is the
principal.63 In practice, however, debt-service or interest payments are as
much of the problem as is the principal. While IMF participation may
aid in the formulation of a productive strategy in order to achieve
sufficient revenues to maintain the perpetual's interest payments, one
must question the need for a program which includes subordination of
existing debt. For instance, the IMF plays an active role in the Baker
plan, yet existing debt still receives priority status. 64 It is questionable
whether one whose claims are already in existence, and who was willing
to take a risk from the outset, would be willing to undertake a similar
risk in the future with the knowledge that a new financial instrument
might be developed which would put its claim on the back-burmer.6
60. See J. GurTEmrAG & R. HERRING, supra note 16, at 7.
61. Id
62. Id at 8.
63. Id. at 8; see also Note, supra note 2, at 275. In fact, virtually none of the LDC
debtors have even begun to repay the principal, and it is the debt service burden that most
of the current reschedulings and refinancings are aimed at alleviating. Note, supra note 2,
at 275.
64. Statement of Treasury Secretary, supra note 26. Although new creditors may not
be as willing to extend financing as they would if a LIFO approach was used, they still may
be willing as long as there is IMF surveillance. J. G ArrENTrG & R. HERRING, supra note
16, at 7. Furthermore, as a matter of fairness to existing creditors, the use of a LIFO
approach is flawed. See id.
65. As a means of illustration, compare this scenario to the modern domestic real estate
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It certainly appears that in order to find new strategies toward
mitigating the world debt dilemma we must induce new players to join
the game. It is also logical to develop new instruments through which
these players will be able to achieve sufficient return to trigger their
participation in an enterprise with a proven speculative background. To
do so by prioritizing new creditor claims, however, will be self-defeating
in that it will sustain a pattern of short-run relief at the expense of long-
term goals. Instead, new instruments must have high return and
versatility, while remaining distinct from current debt. Section IV will
focus upon such instruments.
IV. FUTURE PATTERNS OF DEBT ALLEVIATION
Governmental policies toward alleviation of LDC debt will continue
because richer nations will continue to feel a moral and social obligation
to help developing nations. Furthermore, economic and political factors,
particularly the high level of resources already allocated to development
projects and a desire for global cooperation, weigh heavily in governmen-
tal contributions toward a resolution. 66  It is becoming increasingly
evident that the debt crises may not be resolved without the aid of the
private sector. The private sector, however, is not motivated by feelings
of good will toward its international neighbors. Instead, and rightfully so,
the private sector will mobilize funds when it is in its best interest to do
so. Certainly, in an esoteric sense, a stable global economy is in the best
interest of the entire private sector. On a more practical level, one must
remember that the early private lenders extended credit to LDCs that had
positive potential. For this reason, the periods of the loans were
relatively short. As the loans began to come due, the banks continued
to finance the LDCs to permit them to service their existing debt. As
the debt grew, lenders realized that what were intended to be short-run
credit extensions were turning into long-run chaos. Thus, elimination of
short-term debt may only be accomplished by long-term policy goals,
with the burden of the LDCs' inability to repay shifting from the LDCs
to the investors and their shareholders. In addition, because the
elimination of debt instruments, or loans, is probably not a viable
consideration in light of the existing status of debt, commercial lenders
appear to be receptive to alternative financing schemes.67
market. A first mortgagee will have serious reservations about extending a mortgage if the
mortgagor may obtain a second mortgage which will have a priority over the first.
66. See, eg, Lovett, supra note 22; see also Bohn, supra note 6.
67. For examples of how lenders are turning to alternate schemes of financing rather
than traditional loans, see Farnsworth, U.S. Proposals Hearten IMF and World Bank, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 1987, at D1, col. 5; Wayne, Securitization, Wall Street's Newest Magic Show,
id., Sept. 13, 1987, § 3, at 1, col. 2; Debt Swapping Opens a Door, EUROMONEY TVADE
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The concerns of commercial institutions are based upon their
fiduciary duties to stockholders, the numbers on their balance sheets, and
their ability to diversify their LDC risk.68 Additionally, exchange and
interest rates are a central focus in financial developments.69 Necessarily,
almost every plan will encompass some governmental participation, or
cooperation, as well as private sector participation, if for no other reason
than to give the private investors a greater degree of confidence.
Furthermore, many current plans are evolving in accordance with the
Baker plan.70 The focus of this section, however, is on the expanding
role of the private sector, noting the constant involvement of the public
sector in all phases of debt alleviation as well.
Under the present methods of restructuring debt, banks are often
forced to make new loans in ordet to keep their outstanding loans at full
value on the books. Such was the case when Brazil unilaterally stopped
paying interest on 67 billion dollars of foreign bank debt on February 20,
1987.71 Lenders were forced into agreements under which they had to
contribute new money in order to avoid reclassification of existing loans
to "value-impaired," 72 which would require the banks to write down
those credits by 10%.73 Brazil is holding out for concessions, such as a
one-year delay before IMF austerity conditions are implemented, before
RNANCE REPORT, Nov. 1986, at 4; Forfaiting: Rates and Market Commentary, id., Oct. 1986,
at 71.
68. As discussed supra note 5, relating to interest, the banks must make sure that their
rate of interest accurately reflects their degree of risk. Similarly, if a lender's exposure to
a small group of LDCs is high then the bank will suffer tremendously in the event a default
occurs. In order to avoid this scenario, banks diversify their risk by loaning to several
debtors. See J. GutrrENTAG & R. HERRING, supra note 16, at 5. If they failed to diversify
from the beginning then they will engage in debt-swapping with other lenders so that each
member of the swap will be able to diversify their risk. See Debt Swapping Opens a Door,
supra note 67, at 4.
69. For example, interest and exchange rates are accounted for in forfaiting transactions.
Forfaiting Rates and Market Commentary, supra note 67. The importance of interest rates
is discussed supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. Exchange rates must also be accounted
for in order to assure the value of repayment. See Waterman, Swapping Banks into
Forfaiting, EUROMONEY TRADE FINANCE, Oct. 1986, at 62.
70. Because the Baker plan calls for continued support from commercial lenders,
anything that permits these institutions to extend more money is in accordance with the
plan. Securitization would promote this goal by packaging debt into securities which would
be sold to private investors. Not only would this measure bring additional funding into the
Third World but it would also free institutional funds which may then be reinvested. See
Wayne, supra note 67. For a more elaborate discussion on securitization see infra notes
88-101 and accompanying text.
71. Truell, Brazil and Banks Discuss Plan to Avert Regulatory Decision to Reclassify Loans,
Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1987, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
72. Id
73. Id
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they will begin to repay their interest while the banks refuse to make
concessions until the interest arrears are closed.74 This is the type of
impasse faced by major LDC creditors.
In order to avoid this sort of dilemma, banks are turning toward
debt swapping.75 From 1986 to the present, debt swapping has been
instrumental in permitting creditor banks and exporters to clear away
existing debt.76 This mechanism, in turn, allows these creditors to extend
new capital, perhaps in another type of debt swap to be discussed infra.
By means of a debt swap, banks agree to sell the debt of one country for
that of another.7 The purpose behind this type of transaction is to
promote a more balanced investment portfolio and to diversify risk. In
doing so, a technique known as forfaiting is often used.78  By means of
forfaiting, interest and exchange rates are accounted for in order to
stabilize the terms of the swap. 9 Forfaiting is completed through a series
of complex transactions. Basically, a series of bills of exchange or
promissory notes are purchased at a fixed rate of interest. Banks
involved in forfaiting must have large capital bases in order to supply the
fixed rate funding requirements of the notes or bills which often have
short-term payments. For this reason, very few were originally involved
in the practice. By supplementing forfaiting with interest rate and
currency swaps, smaller banks with lower capital bases are able to enter
the forfaiting market.10 This allows smaller private investors to enter the
market and permits diversification on a wider scale.8'
74. Id
75. Debt Swapping Opens a Door, supra note 67, at 4.
76. Id
77. Id
78. Waterman, supra note 69, at 62. For a discussion of a new international financing
technique which is designed to alleviate the high-risk confronted by a forfait note holder,
see Ludwig & Coursey, The Export Trade Note: A New Instrument for International Trade,
16 GA. J. OF INVL AND COMp. L. 381 (1986).
79. Waterman, supra note 69, at 62.
80. 1d; see also Debt Swapping Opens a Door, supra note 67, at 4.
81. Forfaiting: Rates and Market Commentary, supra note 67, at 71, sets forth an analysis
of a country's risk assessed by the forfait market. The risk is based on the discount rate
on the note issued by the importer/debtor. Because the note is backed by a reputable
local bank, the risk is closely aligned to that of the country. Of the 44 debtor nations in
the analysis, Brazil's discount rate was the highest at 7%. Furthermore, while the typical
maturity for these notes is three to five years, Brazil's notes are the shortest, at one year.
Many forfaiters ceased issuing quotes on Mexico's notes. The United States of America,
along with West Germany, Switzerland and Japan had the lowest discount rate, showing
international confidence in their ability to repay. Those nations, along with Great Britain,
the Netherlands and Canada also had a no limit ("NL") status as to the maturity date at
which discounters would accept the note. Those maturity dates are contingent upon the
payment of the bi-annual servicing. Id.
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Forfaiting is but one of the financial techniques that is becoming
available to introduce more private investment into world debt situations,
while encompassing practical problems such as interest rates and currency
exchange rates. The other type of debt swap is a debt-for-equity
arrangement.82 In this type of situation, the following generally occurs.
A debtor is unable to service its debt. Instead of looking to a classic
restructure, as in the Brazilian example discussed earlier, the creditor will
sell its loan at a discount.83 The purchaser of the loan will then trade
the loan in at the central bank for local currency.84 The central bank
will generally recount for the discounted value of the loan but the
currency will naturally be worth less.81 The money will then be invested
in a local enterprise from which the investors seek to gain from the
profits it generates.86
An offshoot of this debt-for-equity swap which has tremendous
potential to attract new investors is a process known as securitization or
equitization.87 Securitization is a method for converting debt into equity
by establishing a portfolio investment fund of existing debt.88 The fund
is capitalized by the issuance of shares.89 These shares may be traded
over the local stock exchanges of the issuing country90 The holder of the
loans will be able to get equivalent value in shares while the loan will be
discounted by a few percentage points.91 Such a program has already
been implemented in Chile.9 The Chilean Central Bank director is
anticipating that 20% of Chilean medium and long-term debt will be
eliminated through the use of this type of swap within its first year.
93
Furthermore, while this type of conversion is initially aimed at current
creditors, the Central Bank is anticipating the availability of such shares
to new investors as well. 4
United States investment bankers are looking at equitization as a
82. Waterman, supra note 69, at 62.
83. Debt Swapping Opens a Door, supra note 67, at 4.
84. Id
85. lId
86. Id
87. Wayne, supra note 67; see also Farnsworth, U.S. Proposals Hearten I.M.F. and World
Bank, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1987, at D1, col. 5.
88. Debt Swaps Wdl Finance Chilean Investnent Fund, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1987, § 1, at
28, col. 4 [herinafter Debt Swaps].
89. Id
90. See Wayne, supra note 67.
91. See Debt Swaps, supra note 88.
92. Id
93. Id
94. Id
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viable option for debt alleviation, as well as a high-income-producing
product for the investment houses.9 The process is similar to that
described above regarding the debt-for-equity swap except that instead of
turning the loan into the central bank of the local nation, several loans
may be put together in a package and sold as a security,96 not unlike a
mortgage-backed security. These securities could take different forms,
backed by a single loan or a group of loans.9
The attraction for this type of investment comes from the potential
for high returns.9 Though an existing loan may yield a mere 8% to its
creditor, if the loan is sold at a 50% discount the yield-to-investment
ratio doubles into a packaged security returning 16%.99 Great risks are
necessarily involved, but high profits are achieved by those who are not
risk adverse. 100
Investors in such issues may wonder about debtor repudiation. 10'
History, however, illustrates that it is not in any party's best interest to
repudiate.Y02 Furthermore, Baker's program leaves those LDCs who want
to "go it alone" to do just that. The implications politically, as well as
economically, demonstrate that such action on the part of an LDC would
be unwise. 103 Although this is a private program and not a public
venture, its commitment to innovative private involvement in the
international debt crisis suggests that the administration would be
committed to support this type of program, assuming proper implementa-
95. See Wayne, supra note 67.
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id Wherever the potential for high returns exists, however, a large risk is always
involved. This scenario is analogous to the way a bank's interest rate must reflect the risk
involved. Therefore, one must be willing to take large risks with one's capital in order to
realize the high returns from a venture such as securitization. See id.
99. Id
100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
101. Litigation in this area often arises out of contracts to purchase or sell goods or in
unstable political environments. See, eg, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction v. Provisional Mil. Gov't., 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.
1984); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. Org. of Petroleum, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Carey v. Nat'l Oil Corp., 592 F.2d
673 (2d Cir. 1979).
102. 22 U.S.C. J 2370(e) (1988), commonly referred to as the Sabbatino Amendment
because it was prompted by Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964),
allows the President to suspend assistance to any country that repudiates a contract or
agreement with a U.S. national. The extension of loans or other finance mechanisms could
easily be molded into conformity with this statute and the result of suspended U.S.
assistance to a repudiating LDC would be too devastating to be a viable option.
103. In addition to the Sabbatino Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1988), the LDCs
are currently unable to be self-sufficient. They have neither the equipment nor the training,
let alone the financial backing to "go it alone."
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tion.104
In the event of troubled relations between debtor and creditor in a
debt conversion, case law appears, by inference, to be in favor of the
creditors. 10 Debtors will be deemed amenable to suit in the situs of the
account receivable under the act of state doctrine.10 This is contingent
upon the misuse or refusal of payments of legitimate debts arising from
the operation of commercial enterprises.1°7 Although debt-for-equity
conversions are so new as to have no case law on record to date, public
policy suggests that such an expansion is reasonable and within the scope
of the treaties.06 The test for such an expansion would probably not be
limited solely to commercial activity. 109 In order to circumvent the
limitations of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in a non-commercial
setting, a direct impact on the United States would have to be shown.110
V. CONCLUSION
The debt crisis is far-reaching. Only through international collaboration
will viable remedies to alleviate it come to fruition. The public sector must
104. For a discussion of how securitization is in accordance with the Baker plan, see
supra note 70.
105. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 683 (1976) (holding that
absent an act of state, foreign debtors must pay their creditors); see also Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction v. Provisional Mil. Gov't., 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), where the court held that
the act of state doctrine did not preclude a federal court from adjudicating American
corporations' claims against a foreign nation based on its expropriation of the corporations'
interests, in light of standards set out in a treaty between the nations.
106. Under the act of state doctrine, a domestic creditor has the privilege of being able
to bring an action in a favorable forum against a debtor. The limitation on this privilege
is that the transaction must be commerical in nature. For a discussion of the scope of the
act of state doctrine see Sabbatio, 376 U.S. at 421-427.
107. See id. at 399; see also Dunhil, 425 U.S. at 687.
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
109. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1605 (1988), promotes
a restrictive theory of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign state. The commercial activity
test will therefore be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Org.
of Petroleum, 477 F. Supp. 553, 567 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The activity of private investors
lending to LDCs would probably satisfy the criteria of being a commercial activity, even if
the loans were made to a foreign government or instrumentality. This probability exists
because a critical factor in determining whether an activity is within the commercial
exception to the F.S.I.A. so as to make the foreign national amenable to suit in the United
States is whether their action had a direct effect on the United States. Carey v. Nat'l Oil
Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1979).
110. See Carey v. Nat'l Oil Corp, 592 F.2d, at 675 (1979); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)
(1988), which allows the "President [to] suspend assistance to the government ot8 any
country to which assistance is provided under... any Act when the government of such
country or any government agency ... 1which hasl ... repudiated or nuliftied existing
contracts, or agreements with any U.S. citizens or any corporation .... "
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continue to make additional funding available to the LDCs conditioned upon
productive use of such financing. Debtors must be willing to look beyond the
short-term future toward longer-term goals and adopt corresponding policies.
Finally, commercial institutions must make efforts to complement traditional
lending practices with new financial instruments and techniques. Only in such
an atmosphere of global coordination will we be able to achieve desirable
long-run results without oppressive short-term conditions.
A debt-for-equity securitization process may be beneficial for several
reasons. To begin with, it shows initiative on the part of the Wall Street
community, a recognized financial superpower, to help alleviate international
problems. The program also fits neatly into Baker's plan, and therefore will
probably be supported by the creditor nations. Because the conversion will
eliminate existing loans, banks will be free to complement the equitization with
new, traditional loans. Furthermore, the securitization process, by its very
nature, attracts investors who would otherwise not have acess to international
markets. Finally, although there is no current law on the subject, similar
events, which may be analogized, have been resolved in ways that suggest
favorable dispositions to secure new investors in the event of litigation.
Eric J. Dale
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